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ABSTRACT
Cloud-hosted services are being increasingly used in online businesses in e.g., retail,
healthcare, manufacturing, entertainment due to benefits such as scalability and reliability.
These benefits are fueled by innovations in orchestration of cloud platforms that make
them totally programmable as Software Defined everything Infrastructures (SDxI). At the
same time, sophisticated targeted attacks such as Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) are
growing on an unprecedented scale threatening the availability of online businesses. In this
thesis, we present a novel defense system called Dolus to mitigate the impact of DDoS
attacks launched against high-value services hosted in SDxI-based cloud platforms. Our
Dolus system is able to initiate a pretense in a scalable and collaborative manner to deter
the attacker based on threat intelligence obtained from attack feature analysis in a two-stage
ensemble learning scheme.
Using foundations from pretense theory in child play, Dolus takes advantage of elas-
tic capacity provisioning via quarantine virtual machines and SDxI policy co-ordination
across multiple network domains. To maintain the pretense of false sense of success after
attack identification, Dolus uses two strategies: (i) dummy traffic pressure in a quarantine
to mimic target response time profiles that were present before legitimate users were mi-
grated away, and (ii) Scapy-based packet manipulation to generate responses with spoofed
IP addresses of the original target before the attack traffic started being quarantined. From
the time gained through pretense initiation, Dolus enables cloud service providers to de-
cide on a variety of policies to mitigate the attack impact, without disrupting the cloud
services experience for legitimate users. We evaluate the efficacy of Dolus using a GENI
Cloud testbed and demonstrate its real-time capabilities to: (a) detect DDoS attacks and
redirect attack traffic to quarantine resources to engage the attacker under pretense, and (b)
coordinate SDxI policies to possibly block DDoS attacks closer to the attack source(s).
viii
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 DDoS Attacks in Cloud Platforms
Cloud computing has become an essential aspect of online services available to customers
in major consumer fields such as e.g., retail, manufacturing, and entertainment. On-demand
elasticity, and other benefits including diversity of resources, reliability and cost flexibil-
ity have led enterprises to pursue the development and operations of their applications in
a “cloud-first” fashion [1]. In addition to above consumer fields, with the growing trend
of hosting critical applications in e.g., finance, biotechnology, and healthcare on cloud
platforms, there is a need to protect these applications from the security threats of cyber
attacks. Sophisticated targeted attacks such as are growing on an unprecedented scale,
threatening the availability of online businesses. Technological trends indicate that the
aforementioned benefits typically rely on software-centric innovations in the orchestration
of cloud resources. These innovations include cloud platforms based on Software De-
fined everything Infrastructures (SDxI) that allow programmability to achieve capabilities
such as speed and agility [2] in elastic capacity provisioning. Additionally, they provide
opportunities to create Software-Defined Internet Exchange Points (SDXs) between multi-
1
Figure 1.1: Akamai DDoS Attack Frequency By Industry Q2 2017-Q1 2017
ple Software-Defined Network (SDN) domains (or Autonomous Systems (ASes)) that can
enable application-specific peering, knowledge sharing of cyber threats, and other cross-
domain collaborations [3]. One of the most common type of cyber attacks targeting cloud
platforms is the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack [4] that leads to Loss of Avail-
ability (LOA) through starvation of critical application resources serving legitimate users.
Figure 1.1 depicts the Akamai Q2 2017 state of the internet report on DDoS attacks. The
security report [5] reports that records on DDoS attacks have increased once again with
more number of attacks recorded from last year.
The DDoS attack defense challenges within a cloud infrastructure are more severe than
traditional cyber security risks in two ways. Firstly, a cloud infrastructure becomes a ‘vul-
nerability amplifier’ to traditional cyber security threats due to the highly elastic nature of
the infrastructure resources designed to serve a large population of consumers. Secondly,
new means of DDoS attacks exist that specifically target cloud infrastructures in vulnerable
areas of application multi-tenancy within a virtual machine (VM), and within an internal
network of a CSP. Moreover, traditional ‘detect-and-react’ defense approaches [6, 7] are
largely ineffective in consistently maintaining the Service Level Agreements (SLA) when
under DDoS attack due to their lack of: (a) agility in response to attack detection, (b)
cost effectiveness for the CSP, and (c) sophistication to tackle intelligent attack strategies.
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Consequently, as an alternative, the cloud security community and even federal organiza-
tions [8] are exploring ‘Cyber Agility and Defensive Maneuver’ (CAADM) mechanisms
that can allow for real-time service restoration through agile cloud resource adaptations
once an attack is detected. The same mechanisms can also limit proliferation of detected
attacks within the cloud infrastructure through preventive VM resource maneuvers.
1.2 Need for Dolus (Defense using Pretense) System
Given the benefits of SDxI-based cloud platforms, the traditional Intrusion Prevention Sys-
tems (IPS) and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) solutions are undergoing major transfor-
mations. Recently, defense strategies such as SDN-based “moving target defense” [9] [10]
have been proposed to protect networks and users against DDoS attacks by migrating net-
works and users from targeted virtual machines (VMs) to other healthy/safe VMs in a cloud
platform. However, such strategies may cause the application response behavior to change
to an extent that alerts the attacker that a high-value target has been hit. Given such a dis-
covery that a service provider is moving a target in order to shelter from the attack impact,
the attacker may then deflect more resources to seek ransom demands in order to stop the
DDoS on the target.
Moreover, if the DDoS attack flows are blacklisted, traditional approaches allow de-
fense only at the attack destination side i.e., any related traffic is dropped at the target-end.
In such cases, the attacker still can escalate the DDoS attacks by crossing many other neigh-
boring domain paths, who may not be inclined to drop the attack flow traffic assuming it
may be legitimate traffic of a peer network. We suppose that SDxI-based cloud platforms
can facilitate capabilities for coordination of policies and creation of incentives to block
such targeted attack flows closer to the attack source side, which can then mitigate the im-
pact on resource flooding for all the providers involved. However, this might require the
target service provider to buy some time in order to bring ‘humans into the loop’ to actually
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enforce attack traffic blocking measures closer to the attack source side.
In this thesis, we address the above challenges and present a novel defense system
called Dolus (named after the spirit of trickery in Greek Mythology) to mitigate the im-
pact of DDoS attacks launched against high-value services hosted in SDxI-based cloud
platforms. The DDoS attack detection is performed in the Dolus system using the threat
intelligence obtained from attack feature analysis in a two-stage ensemble learning scheme
that we developed. The first stage focuses on anomaly detection to identify salient events
of interest (e.g., connection exhaustion), and the second stage is invoked to distinguish
the DDoS attack event type amongst the 5 common attack vectors: DNS (Domain Name
System), UDP (User Datagram Protocol) fragmentation, NTP (Network Time Protocol),
SYN (short for synchronize), SSDP (simple service discovery protocol). Our Dolus sys-
tem is novel owing to a scalable and collaborative defense strategy that uses foundations
from pretense theory in child play [11] [12] along with SDxI-based cloud platform capa-
bilities for: (a) elastic capacity provisioning via ‘quarantine VMs’, and (b) SDxI policy
co-ordination across multiple network domains. Such a strategy is aimed at preventing the
disruption of cloud-hosted services by deceiving the attacker through creation of a false
sense of success, and by keeping the attacker from recognizing that a high-value target has
been impacted and is being moved.
1.3 Software Defined Network programmability and Fre-
netic
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is an emerging technology which allows programma-
bility in the network through decoupling of data plane and control plane. [13] provides a
novel work by surveying capabilities of SDN programming with focus in defense mech-
anisms against DDoS attacks. SDN capabilities such as software-based traffic analysis,
global viewing of network, centralized control, dynamic updating of forwarding rules make
4
it easy to detect and to react DDoS attacks in cloud platforms.
The programming language we use for our logical centralized controller is Frenetic [14].
Frenetic is a family of network programming languages which allows for programmable
networks using Python and NetKat [15] (also developed by the creators of Frenetic to help
in specifying OpenFlow policies). This allows one to write scripts in Python which can be
run against the packets identified for investigation. These scripts will allow to determine
where the current and future packets should go. Once a decision is made about where a
packet goes, a network device can learn this decision and continue to forward those packets
according to the rule without need of future investigation. Our goal with using Frenetic is
to be able to quickly identify an attackers packets and teach each switch to send that traffic
elsewhere. Frenetic can also run an HTTP Listener with which one can make RESTful
web service calls. We use this functionality in order to GET data about the network as
well as POST policy updates into Frenetic which then sends the policies downstream to the
switches.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we describe the thesis
background and literature review, that provide context to the solution approach. In Chapter
3, we elaborate on our solution and provide a detailed description of our approach with an
overview and reference architecture. Chapter 4 evaluates the effectiveness of our system
and show results of outlier detection and classification of our two-stage ensemble method.
Chapter 5 discusses future work and provides information on extending the system for
different targeted attacks. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Survey
In this chapter, we provide some background information on fundamental concepts be-
hind the system. We then discuss the various literature work that have led to the idea and
implementation of this research.
2.1 Flooding Attacks
There are various types of flooding attacks that have been utilized to trigger Loss of Avail-
ability (LOA) in web servers over the years. These attacks are mainly divided into types:
a) Volume based or Volumetric DDoS attacks, b) Protocol attacks and c) Application Layer
attacks. Table 2.1 list DDoS types and a few example of attacks that fall under those types.
Table 2.1: DDoS attack types and examples
DDoS types Example
Volume based/ volumetric DDoS attacks ICMP, UDP and spoofed-packet floods
Protocol Attacks SYN floods, Ping of Death
Application Layer Attacks GET/POST floods, web server vulnerabilities
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Defense against flooding attacks such as DDoS typically involves attack traffic feature
learning that provides intelligence on where the attack is coming from, and the specific
attack type(s) [16] [17] [18]. Analysis of features such as source IP, destination IP, source
port, destination port, size of packets, packet identifiers commonly help in subsequent fil-
tering of flooding attacks. Authors in [19] show that the Internet traffic patterns are dis-
tinguishable, which can help filter and isolate attack traffic flows. Once attack flows are
filtered, blacklists are created [20], which can then be used to “scrub” the flows through
scrubbing SaaS services as a low-cost solution [21].
2.2 Location-based SDN-enabled Defense
Defense against flooding attacks have been utilized focusing on various locations. The
research works using SDN for defense systems include at the Network, the source side and
the destination side of the attack. They have been categorized and covered as below.
2.2.1 Network-based Mechanisms
DDoS defense strategies are typically handled in the network. A number of such in-network
defense involves analysis of traffic and dynamic updation of rules to effectively reroute it.
Such efforts include Choi et al. [22], which proposes a novel architecture that reacts to
targeted attacks using accountability and content-aware supervision. Similarly, using vol-
ume counting, [23] provides a DDoS mechanism to monitor the traffic flow in OpenFlow
switches. In the context of programmability of SDN switches to mitigate targeted attacks,
Shin et al. [24] discusses a novel programming framework to that end. Yu et al. [25] pro-
poses a memory-efficient system that uses Bloom filter and installs a monitoring tools into
switch’s data plane. The work specifically focuses on the programmability and dynamic
rule update characteristics of SDN to mitigate targeted attacks. [26] shows how a moni-
7
toring node that communicates with the controller can be used to build a global view of
the network to monitor information from every user in the network. Idziorek et al. takes a
traditional approach of intrusion prevention to prevent DDoS attacks [27].
2.2.2 Destination-based Mechanisms
Leveraging the dynamic rule update feature of SDN, Tian et al. [28] analyzes the probabil-
ity that a flow is traced back across multiple Autonomous System (AS) hops by sampling
the probability and the signature of the attack traffic. NetSight captures packet histories to
investigate events of interest to trace the network state [29].
2.2.3 Source-based Mechanisms
Yan et al. [13] presents a survey of SDN-based mechanisms to detect attacks closer to the
attackers/attack sources. Mehdi et al. [30] shows how to perform real-time traffic analysis
on OpenFlow switches to detect mobile malware. Similarly, [31] uses SDN features such
as dynamic update of rules and global view from centralized controller to effectively tackle
the problem of source address validation.
2.3 Defense through Trickery
Clark et al., in [32], shows the effectiveness of randomizing IP addresses in decoy-based
MTD and tries to introduce the notion of tricking the attackers through IP randomization
methods. However, our approach adds to [32] by preventing potential attack outcomes.
Our notion of pretense is akin to Honeypots and Honeynets which are effective in gaining
information about possible attacks based on minimal active interactions with attackers [33].
Primarily they are used in a setting to either gain more information about potential attacks
or the behavior of attackers. Our work is complementary to Honeypots/Honeynets: we
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employ pretense to deceive attackers by rerouting and responding to attack traffic using a
QVM. Our pretense theory is more sophisticated where the foundation lies on the child
psychology where we reach the assumption stimulus match [11].
Our work is looking at defense against flooding attacks which is mostly addressed by
finding some attack feature learning that determines where the attack originates from and
its type. Secondly, we use blacklisting and information gathering to block the attack traffic
and to find out the flow and its origin. Thirdly, since we have cloud resources, we use
elastic capacity provisioning, similar to MTD. We initiate pretense to keep the attacker
guessing in a way that he doesn’t figure out the trickery and chase back. We use some
time before the attacker figures out the pretense, to coordinate across the unified SDxI
infrastructure that could potentially help us block the attacker closer to the source. We
instantiate this framework to collectively stop the attacker in collaborative way utilizing
the scaling capability of a cloud, that altogether helps us get them closer to the source.
2.4 Literature Review
In this section, we provide reviews of work that motivated in building our research work on
DDoS defense mechanism that is Dolus.
2.4.1 Moving Target Defense
Moving Target Defense (MTD) based resource obfuscation/adaptation mechanisms can be
effective to protect critical cloud-hosted applications. For instance, MTD-based mecha-
nisms can be used to perform both: (i) proactive resource adaptation, to detect a DDoS
attack and act defensively before major damage is inflicted, and (ii) reactive resource adap-
tation, to act defensively after an attack has occurred. At the same time, MTD-based mech-
anisms are amenable to leverage the emerging SDN paradigm to achieve dynamic network
9
resource management. Work in [34] discuss a reactive and proactive defense solution
against DDoS attack by utilizing cloud’s resource adaptation and elastic capacity provi-
sioning. The figure 2.1 show their system architecture that depicts VM migration when an
attack occurs, leveraging SDN capabilities.
Figure 2.1: MTD based VM migration technique against DDoS attacks
Though this work presents both before attack and after attack methods to defend against
DDoS attacks, they are done at the destination side i.e., at the cloud platform. Our work
focus on idea of sharing knowledge across multiple domains for better chances of detecting
attacks at the origin of attack. We use proactive mechanism in providing resource adap-
tation through elastic capacity provisioning in our False Reality establishment which is
explained later in section 3.3.
2.4.2 SDN for DDoS Survey
SDN shows great promise in defending or responding to DDoS attacks. Open Networking
Foundation (ONF) [35] is an organization dedicated to the development and commercial-
ization of SDNs. SDNs are widely popular in defeating DDoS attacks because of their
10
good features in maintaining a secured network against different cyber attacks. Current
interesting emerging technology can help reduce DDoS attacks significantly. Figure 2.2
shows classification of defense mechanisms using SDN. The survey in this novel work is
informative and give ideas of different previous research works classifying the works based
on source, destination or at the network.
Figure 2.2: Classification of defense mechanisms against DDoS attacks using SDN
Compiled from [13], SDN provides
• Separation of control and data plane: helps in experimenting attacks and their detec-
tion which when successful, can be made operational. Also provides programmable
networks
• Centralized controller: has global view of the network and permits dynamic quar-
antine of compromised hosts. SDX controller provide added ability to coordinate
between one another across different Autonomous Systems (ASes) and IXPs
• Programmability through external applications: hetwork can be programmed using
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intelligent IDSes
• Software based traffic analysis: traffic can be analyzed to help switch improve its
capabilities through the analysis
• Dynamic updating and forwarding rules
We utilize this survey of SDN capabilities in mitigation of DDoS attacks in cloud plat-
forms and take it a step ahead to provide a global solution to DDoS defense. The following
section gives a briefly discuss an emerging technology based on SDN. Authors in the re-
search propose SDN in Internet Exchange Points (IXPs).
2.4.3 Software Defined Internet Exchange (SDX)
SDNs that are enabled at the Internet Exchange Points (IXP) [36] are called SDX. Key
points that we gather from the paper to utilize in our work are: a) Knowledge sharing of
cyber threats and b) cross-domain collaboration. DDoS attacks can be prevented from en-
tering cloud platforms that are hosting the web services. For a successful mitigation, it is
important that the attack is stopped near to its source rather than at the target destination.
This can be obtained if there is proper knowledge sharing of cyber threats across multi-
ple domains, or Autonomous Systems in our case, to detect the attack at source of attack
origination.
In traditional approaches, if the DDoS attack flows are blacklisted, they are only applied
at the attack destination side i.e., any related traffic is dropped at the target end. In such
cases, the attacker still can escalate the DDoS attacks by crossing many other neighboring
domain paths, who may not be inclined to drop the attack flow traffic assuming it may be
legitimate traffic of a peer network. We suppose that SDxI-based cloud platforms, similar
to our case, can facilitate capabilities for coordination of policies and creation of incentives
to block such targeted attack flows closer to the attack source side, which can then mitigate
the impact on resource flooding for all the providers involved. However, this might require
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the target service provider to buy some time in order to bring ‘humans into the loop’ to
actually enforce attack traffic blocking measures closer to the attack source side.
2.4.4 Pretense Theory
There have been efforts that seek to implement defense mechanisms using some form of
‘trickery’ to engage an attacker as discussed earlier in section 2.3. Dolus system’s pretense
theory is mainly built upon the work in [11] and [12] belonging to the field of child pretend
play psychology. Our novel defense by pretense mechanism for effective mitigation of
DDoS attacks is inspired by the authors’ experiments where they show children (analogous
to our attackers) various pictures of the animals along with a mismatch of the sounds made
by the associated animals. Observations are made on how a pretense is effective based
on how long it takes for a child to understand/protest that the information portrayed is
actually false. In our case, the longer an attacker is tricked by our pretense, the more time a
cloud service provider has to perform MTD mechanisms, strategize on patching identified
vulnerabilities, as well as implement a SDxI-based infrastructure policy coordination for
mitigation of the impact of a DDoS attack.
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Chapter 3
Dolus Defense Methodology
In this chapter, we first present an overview of our proposed Dolus system. Following this,
we describe the attack model that we assume to design our defense. Lastly, we detail our
defense solution that uses a ‘defense by pretense’ scheme.
3.1 Dolus System Overview
The pretense in the Dolus system is designed to create stimulus from the target side that
matches the initial expectation of an attacker that a high-value target has not yet been com-
promised through an automated bot activity. Pretense theory concepts from [11] motivate
us to address the issue of how a cognitive agent can present a pretense world, which is
different from the real world using the following four steps:
(a) The basic assumption(s) or premise(s) that is used by a pretender on what is being
pretended.
(b) Inferential elaboration which details of what goes into or what actually happens in
the process of pretense.
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(c) Appropriate behavior production which answers the question of whether the pre-
tender was successful on the audience being tricked.
(d) Balancing and steering the effects of pretense.
For use cases to guide our design, we borrow ideas from an example experiment from [12],
where a child (i.e., the attacker in our case) is shown the image of a dog that makes the
sound of a duck. In this situation, the child protests saying that it is not the sound that a
dog makes. However, if the same child is shown an image that seemingly looks like a duck
(in reality, it is not) and makes the sound of a duck, then there is no protest and the child
falls for the pretense. However, given additional observation time, the child realizes he/she
has been tricked and protests. Thus, we can see that an effective pretense in our case can
be designed as shown in Figure 3.1 by creating pertinent stimulus from the target side i.e.,
redirecting attack traffic to a quarantine VM that mimics original target behavior, when our
two-stage ensemble learning algorithm can blacklist the attacker flows from benign user
flows. This in turn could help in keeping an attacker distracted for a brief period of time
when the pretense is in effect.
From the time gained through such a pretense initiation, Dolus enables cloud service
providers to decide on a variety of policies by dynamically generating network policies
using Frenetic [14] to mitigate the attack impact, without disrupting the cloud services
experience for legitimate users. In the worst case, destination-side blocking can be en-
forced. Alternately, if the cloud service provider uses the attack intelligence informa-
tion and successful pretense time to coordinate the ‘humans in the loop’ of neighboring
SDN-enabled domains, together they can direct a unified SDN controller that directs SDN-
enabled switches to actually enforce attack traffic blocking measures closer to the attack
source side.
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the proposed Dolus system scheme wherein the attacker is tricked
by redirection of the attack traffic to a quarantine VM for pretense initiation, while the
providers work collaboratively to block the attack traffic closer to the source side.
3.2 Attack Model
DDoS attacks aim to overwhelm network-accessible devices such as networks, firewalls
and end-systems in enterprises by sending packets at excessively high rates. With cloud-
hosted applications with large monetary value becoming highly common, DDoS attacks
can cause ‘Loss of Availability’ for users/customers and can be used for extortion from
vulnerable online businesses. Common DDoS attack event types are amongst the 5 com-
mon attack vectors: DNS (Domain Name System), UDP (User Datagram Protocol) frag-
mentation, NTP (Network Time Protocol), SYN (short for synchronize), SSDP (simple
service discovery protocol). For the purposes of our work, we assume the DDoS attacker
uses SYN [37] and ICMP/Ping [38] flooding. Such attacks typically inundate a networks’
resources with Echo Request packets. We also assume that the attackers’ traffic is sent
constantly and may or may not solicit a response in return. Such attacks can bring the
network to a standstill due to the high volume of both incoming and outgoing traffic. To
effectively capture the semantics of this attack model and to exhaust the target applica-
tion services, we generate and emit synthetic ping and HTTP traffic using hping3 [39]
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and SlowHTTPTest [40] tools, respectively. Furthermore, to capture the dynamics of an
attacker, we randomly change the number of attack packets emitted by these tools.
Figure 3.2: Cross-domain physical setup in a Dolus system deployment to share threat
intelligence for a unified controller to coordinate policy management with a federation of
ASes to block attack traffic closer to the source side.
3.3 Establishment of dummy-traffic based False Reality
As part of our reactive defense mechanism, we devise a dummy-traffic based false real-
ity environment to trick attackers into thinking their attack is still in progress, while being
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quarantined for monitoring and logging. As part of this pretense environment, a dedicated
VM is used to create and send dummy user packets to the attacked server. This creates a
false perception to the attacker that users are continuing to connect to the attacked server
while in actuality the application has already been migrated to a new server, and all le-
gitimate users properly redirected to it. As soon as the attack is detected, migration and
false reality get triggered simultaneously so as to: (a) prevent attackers from recognizing
attack failure, identification of a high-value target and retrying with greater resources, (b)
sustain affected services for longer time to collect data to analyze the signature and pattern
of attackers, to be prepared for future attacks with minimal increase in the overall CSP cost.
Statistically, an attacker can differentiate between dummy VM and a real VM hosting
an application for multiple users by probing message response times and percentage of
dropped packets. In [41], the authors have proved that if the mean response times for the
dummy and real VMs are equal to 1rtd , and
1
rtr
, then the number of responsesK needed for
the attacker to distinguish between dummy and real VMs within time T is given as:
K = argmin
k
‖( rtr
rtd
)k
e−(rtr−rtd)T >C (3.1)
where C is a parameter dependent on the rate of attacker probes and in turn on the attacker’s
attack budget.
Thus, in order for an attacker to quickly distinguish between decoy and real VMs, the
attacker has to either: (a) increase the attack budget, or (b) rely on the difference between
the response times from dummy and real VMs 1rtd and
1
rtr
, respectively to be big enough.
In other words, greater the difference, higher are the chances of dummy/real VM identi-
fication. However, for the first option, increasing the attack budget would mean a greater
chance of getting detected for the attacker. Thus, in most cases attackers would rely on
their ability to precisely differentiate between the response times. Therefore, from the per-
spective of a CSP, if the false reality can minimize the difference between the dummy and
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real VM response times, the probability of the attacker detecting a dummy VM within fi-
nite amount of time will decrease. Thus, in our MTD with false reality implementation, we
will use dummy VMs to generate just the adequate amount of dummy traffic to the VM un-
der attack (after application migration and user redirection) that mimics the realistic traffic
pattern of regular users. Such a dummy traffic will ensure that when the attacker returns
to intermittent probing periods between prolonged flooding periods, the attacker does not
experience any noticeable difference between the behaviors of the VM, with/without the
regular users. For simplicity of analysis, we will assume the scenario of a single attacker
for analysis, however our propositions will also be valid for multiple attacker scenarios.
Another important consideration while establishing a false reality environment is its
cost-benefit analysis. Although the benefit of keeping an attacker entrapped and efforts to
minimize the chances of future attacks is well motivated, we make a simplistic approach
below to quantitatively analyze the cost and benefits of implementing our proposed false
reality environment. The overall cost of false reality implementation (CFR) to the CSP
through dummy VM installation and dummy traffic generation is essentially the cost of
CPU utilization (CCFR) of the VM and the network cost (C
N
FR) for dummy traffic generation
that can be expressed as:
CFR =CCFR +C
N
FR (3.2)
On the other hand, qualitative benefits of false reality are the fact that the regular users ex-
perience no or little service interruption boosting the CSP revenue, and continued collection
of attack statistics from the VM under attack for more efficent proactive migration strat-
egy design. However, in order to quantify the benefits, we take the approach of measuring
the “lost opportunity cost” of false reality, i.e., the amount of cloud resource (network and
compute) saved by preventing attacker to migrate with the target application and relaunch
an attack on the new VM, thereby jeopardizing new resources. Such resource saving is
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in turn equal to the cost of a DDoS attack in terms of cloud resource wastage (CCDDoS for
compute resource an dCNDDoS for network resource). Thus, if we ignore the benefits of at-
tack statistics collection which is beyond the scope of this work, then the overall benefits of
false reality in terms of “lost opportunity cost” is equal to or greater than the cost of DDoS
attack, and can be expressed as:
BFR > (CCDDoS +C
N
DDoS) (3.3)
Therefore, if we compare the costs and benefits of false reality from Equations (3.2)
and (3.3) respectively, implementing false reality environment will only be cost effective
or optimal, if the CSP defense mechanism obtained from the ‘Attack Profiler’ satisfies the
following conditions:
CCDDoS >C
C
FR & C
N
DDoS >C
N
FR (3.4)
3.4 Defense by Pretense Scheme
Figure 3.2 depicts the cross-domain setup in a Dolus system deployment to implement a
defense by pretense scheme. To complement Figure 3.2, interactions between different
phases of a Dolus system configured for spoofing pretense are shown in Figure 3.4 and
Algorithm 1, respectively.
Dolus flow diagram is depicted in figure 3.3 and lists different phases of Dolus system.
This brief representation of how the flow of traffic happens in the network includes three
stages.
• Detection: Our two-stage learning scheme analyzes network traffic to detect and
differentiate benign user traffic from the attack traffic.
• Control: Frenetic based controller decides the rerouting of attack traffic to the Quar-
20
Figure 3.3: Dolus Scheme Flow Diagram
antine VMs.
• Policy Updating: Through JSON arrays, administrative UI shares knowledge of at-
tack to possibly block the attack closer to the source of attack i.e., at slave switch
closest to the attack origin.
3.4.1 Attack Detection
First, traffic within a cloud provider’s network (which is generated by the SDN switches) or
across multiple transit provider ASes (which are composed of SDX plus SDN switch sub-
strates) is monitored using a Frenetic runtime [14]-enabled monitoring subcomponent (line
24 of Algorithm 1). Next, in order to learn and classify the attacks (line 25 of Algorithm 1),
we employ a two-stage ensemble learning scheme on the incoming traffic, both from the
attackers and from the benign users. In order to differentiate attackers from benign users,
the first stage handles outlier detection to identify salient events of interest (e.g., connection
exhaustion), whereas the second stage handles outlier classification to distinguish different
event types (e.g., DDoS attack).
Outlier Detection
We use basic/static methods such as multivariate Gaussian to detect outliers and build
upon our prior work on detecting network-wide correlated anomaly events [42, 43] that
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Algorithm 1: Dolus system phases for spoofing pretense
Input: attacker ID = attacker ID,
src ip = source IP,
dst ip = destination IP,
no o f packets = number of packets,
spoo f dst ip = spoofed IP,
black ip blacklisted IP list
Result: Attack traffic will be redirected to the quarantine VM and DDoS blocking
policy will be generated
1 function initQuarantine()
2 createVM();
3 updatePolicy(src ip);
4 do
5 redirectTraffic();
6 pretense data = generateUsingScapy();
7 vmResponse(spoof dest ip, src ip, dst ip, pretense data);
8 while timeout == false;
9 end
10 function updatePolicy (src ip)
11 logAttackTraffic();
12 new policy = generateNewPolicy();
13 collaborate(new policy);
14 end
15 function collaborate (new policy)
16 advertisePoliciesToNeighbors(new policy);
17 black ip = updateList(src ip);
18 redirectTraffic();
19 end
20 function redirectTra f f ic ()
21 sendTrafficToQuarantineVM();
22 end
23 function main ()
24 /* Receive incoming data from external machine */
data = monitorPackets(attacker ID, src ip, no of packets, start time, end time);
25 attack = twoStageEnsembleLearning(data);
26 /* Update policy in case of attack detected */
if attack == true then
27 initQuarantine(src ip);
28 end
29 decideToStopOrContinue();
30 end
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are typical of the traffic from multiple attack sources. Specifically, the outlier detection
is a composition of many efficient, multivariate outlier detectors or hypotheses functions:
H = {h1,h2, ...,hn} and the result,F , is an ensemble of the different hypotheses. Further-
more, we note that the traditional methods for ensemble learning use averaging or majority
voting [44]. In our case, to achieve higher accuracy with a minimum size of the training
dataset D, we use the Bayesian voting scheme [45] as the ensemble method to predict the
result for new data x, which can be represented as Equation 3.5.
F = ∑
h∈H
h(x)P(h|D) (3.5)
Final ensemble result F consists of all of the hypotheses in H , and each hypothesis
h weighted by its posterior probability P(h|D). The posterior probability is proportional to
the likelihood of the training data D times the prior probability of h (3.6).
P(h|D) ∝ P(h)P(D|h) (3.6)
Outlier Classification
The outliers detected are classified into either interesting events (e.g., attacks) or erroneous
conditions (e.g., router failure). We use a simple classifier to this end: if the final ensemble
results of consecutive events (detected in the first stage) fall in the same range, we classify
them as an attack; otherwise, we ignore those events. We remark that the above two-
stage ensemble learning scheme requires a sizable amount of data to classify the attacks
effectively. To overcome this challenge, we initially let the attacker(s) to attack the cloud
services. However, we also monitor the incoming traffic carefully and make sure that the
attack does not disrupt the network resources. Once an attack is classified, which are shown
separately in Figure 3.2, we reroute the attack traffic using Frenetic runtime to quarantine
VM (QVM) along with sample server responses (see lines 1 through 22 of Algorithm 1).
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Figure 3.4: Sequence diagram of the Dolus system interactions for attack detection, quar-
antine setup, pretense initiation/maintenance and DDoS attack impact mitigation.
3.4.2 Quarantine Setup
Dolus calls the quarantine setup procedure (lines 1 to 9) where a new QVM is instantiated
using a cloud platform’s elastic provisioning capability and the update policy routine is
invoked (line 3). In the update policy routine (lines 10 to 14), we log the attack traffic to
prevent future attack events as well as invoke the Frenetic runtime to generate new poli-
cies (line 12). Frenetic executes Python scripts to identify suspicious packets, learn from
patterns and directs switches to redirect packets to QVMs. We then advertise this infor-
mation (attack intelligence) to the neighboring switches (line 13), where, apart from the
policy updates, the IP addresses of the attackers are blacklisted. Following this, based on
the stored attack traffic logs, the QVM uses Scapy libraries [46] to generate responses with
spoofed IP addresses and pretends as the targeted VM under attack from the perspective of
the attacker(s) (lines 20 to 22). Scapy is a python based library which allowed us to write
python scripts to spoof IPs. An instance of Scapy test script is shown in figure 3.5.
24
Figure 3.5: Scapy snippet setting up spoofed source IP address
3.4.3 Pretense Initiation
Subsequently, depending on the nature and volume of the incoming data, we decide either
to move forward with the pretense or drop the traffic—which is the third step of production
of appropriate behavior in pretense theory (lines 28 to 30). In order to gain more infor-
mation about the attackers/attacks, we typically continue the process of pretense. While
we continue the pretense, we routinely update attack intelligence such as the attacker’s IP,
targeted VM’s IP where service(s) under attack is hosted, type of attacks, etc. Furthermore,
we assume that an attacker has enough knowledge on how a successful attack should affect
our system, which is another reason why we keep the attacker involved in the system as
long as is usually expected. If we drop the attack traffic too early or keep it in the system
for too long, they might potentially infer our pretense.
3.4.4 Pretense Maintenance
Finally, we redirect the flow of the attack traffic by pushing a new policy from the unified
controller running in the cloud to the switch(es). This will redirect the attacker’s traffic that
is intended for the targeted VM towards the QVM. The QVM then responds to the attacker’s
traffic as though it is the targeted VM/server under attack with spoofed IP address and
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hostname of the target, which creates the pretense effect, from an attacker’s perspective,
that the targeted DDoS attack is successful. Depending on the nature of the attack, we
want the attacker to believe that services are no longer up/available on the targeted VM. We
therefore allow the QVM to continue to respond to the attacker for a limited amount of time
t. We tune t based on the type of attack traffic and how the targeted VM would respond if
it was under attack. For example, if the targeted VM went down after 10 seconds of attack,
the QVM would do the same by not responding at the same time with a variable random
delay factor of [-1,1] seconds added. This allows the attacker to see that the services are
available until, suddenly, they no longer are.
3.4.5 Policy Decision Making
In this sense, our defense maintains the pretense: gives the attacker the confirmation of a
successful attack, when in reality the service has not been affected at all as seen in the Fig-
ure 4.2 considering the scenario that the user is running a video gaming portal application.
This also gives us sufficient time to collect information about the attackers and their attack
patterns. We use the collected information to create a blacklist of attacker information. To
help network administrators effectively manage the network in the face of attacks, our sys-
tem also consists of a Administrator User Interface module and a unified controller module
that can be customized in a Dolus system instance deployment depicted in Figure 3.2. The
User Interface shown in Figure 4.3 can be used for e.g., to enforce users to adhere to the
policies generated by Frenetic runtime when they connect to the cloud. Policies generated
by Frenetic internally are updated through the User Interface using JSON arrays. These
policies (e.g., open/block flows) could be installed in the switches using the unified con-
troller module, which is also linked with a back-end database that logs traffic characteristics
and user profiles.
The after effects of our pretense only lasts for as long as they are needed. During the
pretense, the attackers’ traffic continues to be redirected a QVM near the attacker. However,
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this process need not continue indefinitely. That is, once if it has been determined that the
attack traffic is no longer impacting the network, the policies can be updated to redirect the
attacker traffic back to where it was prior to the start of pretense. There are several reasons
to do this: (i) changes in the dynamics of the attack (e.g., bandwidth usage dropping back
down to normal, absence of SYN packets in a SYN flooding attack, fixing of malware in
an affected machine and hence it is no longer an attacker, etc.) calls for network policy
changes so that the network resources can be effectively used, (ii) changes in traffic e.g., IP
address change in incoming service requests sent from a benign user must be serviced to
meet the service level agreement (SLA), and (iii) to save the operational cost of QVMs by
reusing them for a different purpose e.g., periodic backups.
3.4.6 Threat Intelligence Sharing
Algorithm 1 runs in the monitor component and coordinates/shares intelligence with the
switches deployed in the network and across different providers. This in turn enables a
collaborative environment among providers such that the targeted attacks can be detected
closer to the source without affecting the cloud infrastructure. A natural question is why
would a provider share the attack intelligence, especially in a business that is driven by
competition? We posit that the coordination among different ASes/providers is mutually
beneficial for all the entities involved. Of course, a particular AS/provider can decide not
to share the attack intelligence to others. However, if an AS experiences an attack and if
it shares the intelligence with other ASes, a global and unified hardening of infrastructure
against such targeted attacks can be achieved. In addition, any downtime is money lost
in a business; sharing the attack intelligence in turn provides a cheaper alternative to lost
downtime and business.
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Chapter 4
Dolus System Testbed and Evaluation
In this chapter, we explain our testbed, user interfaces and then finally show the perfor-
mance of the system, its schemes and components. This includes the two-stage ensemble
learning algorithm, reactive false reality scheme and then the evaluation of Dolus imple-
mentation.
We,
• Test the accuracy of outlier detection and outlier classification using different datasets
that include train and test data
• Present perfomance comparison of False Reality and Moving Target Defense and
then the efficiency evaluation of False Reality in terms of cost
• Present results from two sets of experiments that were run for a maximum of 28
seconds to show how our Dolus implementation can be used in real-time to restore
cloud services under DDoS attack situations
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4.1 Experiment Setup
This section provides detailed information of our testbed, user interface and the adminis-
trator UI.
4.1.1 Testbed Setup
Figure 4.1: GENI Cloud testbed setup used to evaluate the Dolus system performance.
We evaluate the efficacy of our Dolus system using a realistic, GENI Cloud [47] testbed
as shown in Figure 4.1. The testbed contains three SDN switches, two slave switches
and a single root switch. The slave switches are each attached to users and attackers, a
quarantine VM, and a connection to the root switch. Likewise, the root switch is connected
to elastic VMs, each of which could serve as a candidate for the target application (i.e., a
video gaming portal) hosting that could be compromised by the attackers. All switches are
connected to a unified SDN controller located in the cloud service provider domain, which
directs the policy updates. To emphasize on use of different ASes, we deploy the testbed
spanned over three GENI aggregates, Missouri, Illinois and Kentucky InstaGENI.
29
4.1.2 Consumer UI
Our User Interface is a video streaming application that we use to mimic a gaming server
for a good reason that gaming industries are the most DDoS attacks impacted industries.
Most recent report as discussed in chapter 1 show that in the second quarter of 2017 saw
numbers of gaming sites being repeatedly hit by DDoS attacks. Approximately 82% of
DDoS attacks in that particular quarter were launched at gaming sites.
Figure 4.2: Video gaming portal application running in a SDxI-based cloud platform with
cross-domain network collaboration.
The UI is built using LAMP stack that consists of a play/pause button and a reset but-
ton to provide users the ability to have control over the video. The web service also logs
the timestamp of video at the time of pause or the time when the webpage is refreshed or
closed. This allows users to start from where they left off.
30
Figure 4.3: Administrator User Interface of an Dolus system instance.
4.1.3 Administrative UI
The backend of Dolus system, as depicted in figure 4.3 is highly customizable and provides
administrators to have view of network through tracks of different features of network. The
UI is built to keep log of everything that happens in the network and resides at the controller
VM as shown in the testbed 4.1. We use Frenetic to program the system as mentioned ear-
lier, and the UI can be used to enforce users to adhere to the policies generated by Frenetic
runtime when they connect to the cloud. Policies generated by Frenetic are internally up-
dated through the UI using JSON arrays.
Figure 4.4: Administrator User Interface : Quarantined VMs
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The UI is developed to automatically make policy updates in the system, to keep track
of attack traffic and then blacklist the attacker’s IP to stop future possible attacks. We show
various instances of this UI, such as the list of quarantined VMs, the UI settings, and so on.
Figure 4.5: Administrator User Interface : Bandwidth utilization when access to root switch
is disallowed
Figure 4.4 shows the list of quarantined VMs at the time when it was recorded. We use
dummy data just for the purpose of explanation.
Similarly, figure 4.5 shows the network bandwidth utilization when Frenetic doesn’t
allow traffic to enter to the core switch. This figure shows the overall network along with
the utilization at both slave and root switch. We can see that there is no traffic movement
at the root switch since we are able to stop the traffic to get in the root switch.
Figure 4.6: Administrator User Interface : Server History
In addition to the instances of UI explained earlier, we can also have record of servers’
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history. 4.6 shows server histories logged based on their reputation. The reputation of a
particular server is determined by the number of times it has been attacked or was targeted
for an attack.
Admin UI is also capable of listing history of attacks that have occurred in the system.
Origin of attack is logged in the system and through UI and using JSON arrays, policy
updates in the system can automatically be made. Attack history is shown in figure 4.7 The
automation also includes blacklisting of attacker’s IP.
Figure 4.7: Administrator User Interface : Attack History
4.2 Attack Detection and Classification
Using the Dolus system, we monitor different types of data that are permitted to enter the
GENI Cloud testbed depicted in Figure 4.1. We send both normal and attack traffic (i.e.,
our datasets) to the targeted server to test the efficacy of our two-stage ensemble learning
scheme. As shown in Figure 4.8, the algorithm module will be initialized in Stage-1. When
an event is detected as an outlier (the probability is larger than ε , which is tuned in training
phase) or if there is a manual trigger, the algorithm will transition to Stage-2, and may
query more data or features to characterize this outlier event. Our evaluation results span
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Figure 4.8: Two stages transition diagram
over two instances of learning of datasets as explained in the following.
The first instance shows multiple traffic types from a single attacker VM to a single
target node. For this instance, we divide ∼180,000 lines of data into two sets, one for
training and the other to test the accuracy of our scheme. Furthermore, the types of traffic
used to create these instances are composed of SlowHTTPTest, iperf, VLC and ICMP
ping. Figure 4.9 shows the two confusion matrices for attack detection and classification
in a normalized fashion. We note that both the detection and the classification of attack
took less than a second. In addition to the rapid detection and classification, our approach
is highly accurate as shown in Table 4.1, where stage 1 is the detection stage and stage 2 is
the classification stage.
In the second instance, we consider multiple traffic types to multiple hosts. This in-
stance is composed of 2.5 million rows per test, totaling 5 million rows of data. The types
of traffic that we use to create this dataset include SlowHTTPTest, iperf, VLC, scp, wget,
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Figure 4.9: Confusion matrices for attack detection and classification for multiple traffic
flows sent to a single server.
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Figure 4.10: Confusion matrices for attack detection and classification for multiple traffic
flows sent to multiple hosts.
and ICMP ping. This dataset also contains some unlabeled/undefined data for the scheme
to assess and classify the training data to evaluate the effectiveness of our two-stage ensem-
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Table 4.1: Overall Attack Detection and Classification Time and Accuracy
Tests Time (in Seconds) Accuracy (in %)
Single server stage 1 1 99.99
Single server stage 2 1 99.98
Multiple hosts stage 1 7 89.12
Multiple hosts stage 2 13 98.49
ble learning scheme. Figure 4.10 shows the two confusion matrices in normalized form for
attack detection and classification. Detection and classification of attack took ∼7 and ∼13
seconds, respectively. Despite the slowdown in attack detection/classification in compari-
son with the first instance, the accuracy of our approach is still high as shown in Table 4.1.
While the two-stage ensemble learning scheme is effective in detecting test data, a new
attack that has not been used in training could initially go undetected and impact services.
However, with pertinent labeling of attack traffic flows during training, the accuracy of the
ensemble learning scheme can be improved significantly. We depict the outlier detection
and classification for a trained cased in Figure 4.11, where we make use of 60% of the data
as training data and 40% as test data for the same dataset used in the 2nd instance. For the
purpose of our evaluation, the sorted dataset has randomized time stamps.
Though the dataset that we use is discrete with differences in traffic such as proto-
col, bytes transmitted, number of packets, source and destination addresses, our two-stage
ensemble learning scheme is effective in detecting the attacks with good accuracy and
efficiency. The ensemble learning scheme can further be modified based on other charac-
teristics of network traffic, and such modifications are beyond the scope of the work in this
paper.
37
Normal Attack
Predicted label
Normal
Attack
Tr
ue
 la
be
l
1.000000 0.000000
0.000000 1.000000
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(a) Attack detection.
slow undefined vlc ping iperf wget scp
Predicted label
slow
undefined
vlc
ping
iperf
wget
scp
Tr
ue
 la
be
l
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(b) Attack classification.
Figure 4.11: Confusion matrices for outlier detection and classification for multiple traffic
flows comprising of familiar attack flows.
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4.3 False reality establishment results
False Reality evaluation supports in determining the amount of dummy traffic that needs
to be synthetically created to instantiate the pretense. In our false reality establishment
evaluation, we compare the results from false reality to a system that offers MTD based de-
fense mechanism [34]. The comparisons are made in terms of the chances for the attacker
to distinguish between VMs with real and dummy traffic. In Figures 4.12, and 4.13, we
compare the average response time and percentage of dropped packets during the idle and
probing phases for the different attack intensity settings. We observe that - for the migra-
tion without false reality, the difference between response times and percentage of dropped
packets before and after migration/redirection is sufficient enough, from [34], for the at-
Figure 4.12: Performance comparison of reactive migration strategies with-and-without
false reality: Average response time
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Figure 4.13: Performance comparison of reactive migration strategies with-and-without
false reality: Percentage of dropped packets
tacker to detect migration/redirection scenarios. Such a detection suggests to the attacker
that a high-value target has been found, and and thus increases the chances of a future
(more intensive) attack. Whereas, for our proposed scheme with false reality, the change
in response time and dropped packets percentage after migration/redirection is negligible.
The effectiveness of our false reality environment shown in Figures 4.12 and 4.13 are direct
outcomes of the intelligent dummy traffic generation insights.
Next, we demonstrate the overall effectiveness of our proposed false reality pretense
in terms of the success rate of an attacker in identifying the presence of dummy traffic in
Figure 4.14. The success rate is calculated by the total number of successful dummy iden-
tifications for the target application consumption by small-to-large number of users. The
results present an average of 20 reactive migration attempts involving different destination
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Figure 4.14: Comparison of successful identification of dummy traffic by the attacker
VMs with varied properties. Figure 4.14 shows that the false reality ensures considerably
lower detection success in terms of identifying the dummy traffic patterns. We observe that
with small number of users, the benefits of false reality is not pronounced enough as with
small amount of traffic generated from small number of users using the target application.
Consequently, the attacker cannot really experience any perceivable difference in response
times when the users are redirected. Thus, it is possible for our schemes with-and-without
false reality to be virtually indistinguishable. Moreover, schemes without false reality per-
form well when number of users using the target application is very small. However, with
large number of users, the attacker can easily identify the migration/redirection with con-
siderable change in response times and dropped packets in the absence of false reality (from
Figures 4.12 and 4.13).
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Figure 4.15: Benefits and costs of false reality in terms of average CPU utilization
Finally in Figure 4.15, we characterize the benefits of the false reality pretense in terms
of the ‘lost opportunity cost’ of a DDoS attack and compare it with the cost of implemen-
tation of the false reality pretense. We perform the comparison in terms of average CPU
utilization in order to ascertain whether the creation of false reality is viable for the CSPs.
We calculated the CPU utilization of the VM hosting the target application during: idle,
probing (200 packets/sec), and flooding periods. We then compared them with the CPU
utilization of the standby VM generating dummy traffic for 100, 300, and 500 users, re-
spectively. From Figure 4.15, it is evident that the utilization of a VM under DDoS attack
is more than 50% higher than an average dummy VM generating traffic for around 300
users, thus satisfying Equation (3.4) for cost effectiveness of the false reality pretense. In-
terestingly while generating high loads of dummy traffic, i.e., mimicking more than 1000
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users’ traffic, the dummy VM’s CPU utilization might be as high as a VM under attack,
thus making false reality less beneficial in those circumstances (at least in terms of CPU
utilization cost). These results overall not only signify the importance of the false reality
pretense in creating an illusion of success for the attacker, but also indicate exactly how
much dummy traffic needs to be generated in a cost effective manner to cope with a given
DDoS attack state.
4.4 Time to restore Cloud-hosted Application Service
Figure 4.16: Comparison of the cloud service restoration time metric with cases of: no
Defense, with MTD and with Dolus.
Figure 4.16 compares the time taken by our Dolus system to stop a DDoS attack versus
MTD-based and no defense strategies. After a warm-up period of 6 seconds, we start
the SlowHTTPTest and hping3 at the 7th second from the attackers. In a SDxI-based cloud
network with no defense strategy, the services are immediately affected by the attack traffic.
Similarly, the MTD-based defense strategy takes ∼6 seconds to mitigate the attack traffic
impact. However, our Dolus system supported service on the other hand, does not suffer
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from any loss of availability in comparison with the other two strategies. This is due to the
sharing of attack intelligence between the slave switches and redirection of attack traffic to
quarantine VMs closer to the attackers, making the cloud network completely oblivious to
the attackers.
4.5 Amount of Traffic Processed at the Root Switch
Figure 4.17: Traffic processed (in Bytes) in one of the slave switches.
Figures 4.17 and 4.18 depict the amount of traffic processed (in Bytes) at one of the
slave switches and the root switch. From Figure 4.18, it is evident that the SDxI-based
cloud network is oblivious to the attack traffic impact, complementing the result in Fig-
ure 4.16. Since the slave switch represented in Figure 4.18 redirects attack traffic to the
quarantine VMs, we observe a 5X increase in the amount of traffic processed in compari-
son with the root switch.
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Figure 4.18: Traffic Processed at the root switch only shows user traffic proving that the
attack traffic is redirected to quarantine VM.
Overall, we find that our Dolus can effectively detect DDoS attack and redirect traffic
in real-time i.e., on the order of seconds depending on the knowledge of the DDoS attack
pattern, and block it closer to the attack source in 1-2 seconds if automated policy updates
are possible in the cross-domain setting. However, if humans need to be brought into the
loop, the time to block the attack can be adjusted so that there is enough time for cross-
domain manual coordination during which an effective pretense of the quarantine VM is
deceiving the attacker with a false sense of success.
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Chapter 5
Summary and concluding remarks
Recent innovations in the orchestration of cloud resources are fueled by the emergence
of the Software-Defined everything (SDx) Infrastructure (SDxI) paradigm. At the same
time, the sophistication of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are growing on an
unprecedented scale, and online businesses in retail, healthcare and other fields are under
constant threat. In this paper, we presented a novel defense system called Dolus to miti-
gate the impact of DDoS attacks against high-value services hosted in SDxI-based cloud
platforms. We proposed a defense by pretense mechanism that can be used during defense
against flooding attacks, which involves a two-stage ensemble learning algorithm to an-
alyze features in order to determine where an attack originates from, and the attack type.
Using blacklisting information, our pretense initiation builds upon pretense theory concepts
in child play psychology to trick an attacker through creation of a false sense of success.
Our above approach takes advantage of elastic capacity provisioning in cloud platforms
to implement moving target defense techniques that does not affect the cloud-hosted appli-
cation users, and contains the attack traffic in a quarantine VM(s). With the time gained
through effective pretense initiation, cloud service providers could coordinate across a uni-
fied SDxI infrastructure involving multiple ASes to decide on policies that help in blocking
the attack flows closer to the source side. Performance evaluation results of our Dolus sys-
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tem in a GENI cloud testbed show that our approach can be effective in filtering, detection
and implementation of SDxI-based infrastructure policy coordination for mitigation of the
impact of DDoS attacks.
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Chapter 6
Future Work
Dolus system can be extended where its components address more complex targeted attacks
such as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) as part of cyberhunting workflows. This will
require advanced data sampling/analysis, as well as relevant machine learning techniques
to help SDxI-based cloud service providers to visualize collateral effects in invoking one
or more defense mechanisms.
Though there have been many approaches in using methods of pretense, the research
work in the system we built, in our opinion, have just emerged and can be bettered by fully
leveraging and implementing knowledge gathering and threat intelligence sharing across
multiple domains. This will need cooperation from heterogeneous Autonomous systems,
to comply with a base system as the coordination amongst different ASes/providers is mu-
tually beneficial for all entities involved.
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